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1 INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, an increasing number of commentators have begun 
to express doubts about the effectiveness of the tort system.! According 
to these critics, tort law does not deter accidents,2 nor does it spread ac-
cident costs efficiently.3 Worst of all, the tort system is extremely expen-
sive to operate.4 Some of this criticism has spilled over into the products 
liability area.5 Products liability law has been condemned as expensive,6 
iheffective,1 and regressive;8 in addition, it has been blamed for higher 
product prices,9 foreign competition,!O problems within the liability insur-
1. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government 
Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REv. 1281, 1317 (1980) ("It is hard to conjure up a system of accident cost 
control more irrational and less reflective of social values than the present tort system."); Stephen D. 
Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 555, 616-17 (1985) ("My judgment is that 
the mammoth social costs of ordinary tort law, importantly including the socially undesirable behav-
ior prompted by tort law, outweigh its benefits."). 
2. See Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the "Crisis": A Reassessment of the Current Concep-
tions of Tort Law, 72 CoRNEll. L. REv. 765, 775 (1987) ("[T]he argument that tort law can allocate 
to injurers the correct costs of injuries and thereby prompt the correct level of safety investment 
seems manifestly implausible."). 
3. See Sugarman, supra note I, at 592-96 (arguing that compensation under tort law is both 
overinclusive and underinclusive). 
4. See John G. Fleming, Is There a Future for Tort?, 44 LA. L. REv. 1193, 1207 (1984) ("The 
most formidable criticism that can be levied against the tort system is its inordinate expense. "); 
Sugarman, supra note I, at 596 ("[T]he tort system is fabulously expensive to operate in comparison 
to modem compensation systems."). 
5. See Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Products Lia-
bility, 60 Mo. L. REv. I, 5 (1995) ("The literature overflows with criticism, and anyone perusing the 
law reviews in recent years might well come away believing that the predominant view is that prod-
ucts liability has been a disaster."); William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Prod-
ucts Liability, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 639, 639 ("Current products liability law is a mess. Its founda-
tion is flawed, its content is exceedingly complex, and its effect on personal injury litigation is 
pernicious."). 
6. See Gregory C. Jackson, Comment, Pharmaceutical Product Liability May Be Hazardous to 
Your Health: A No-Fault Alternative to Concurrent Regulation, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 199, 233 (1992) 
("Strict liability thus creates excessive administrative or transactional costs in the form of litigation 
expenses .•.. "). 
7. See Powers, supra note 5, at 644 ("It is debatable, both analytically and empirically, 
whether strict liability increases product safety, much less whether it tends to optimize product 
safety.") (emphasis removed). 
8. See George L. Priest, Modem Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U. L. REv. I, 17 (1987) 
(describing the regressive effects of damage rules in products liability on low-income consumers); 
Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE LJ. 353, 
405-06 (1988) (describing the same phenomenon). 
9. See Tun Moore, Comment, Comment K Immunity To Strict Liability: Should Prescription 
Drugs Be Protected?, 26 Hous. L. REv. 707, 718 (1989) ("Only two manufacturers of DTP vaccine 
remain in the market, and the cost of each dose rose from 11 cents in 1982 to $11.40 in 1986, $8 of 
which was for an insurance reserve."). 
10. See William A. Worthington, The "Citadel" Revisited: Strict Tort Liability and the Policy 
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ance industry, II corporate bankruptcies,12 lack of product development, 13 
and the removal of useful products from the market.14 
Much of the problem appears to lie with the concept of enterprise li-
ability, which has provided the intellectual foundation for strict products 
liability for more than thirty years. IS The theory of enterprise liability as-
sumes that product sellers are always in the best position to prevent inju-
ries and to spread accident costs.16 However, not only is this proposition 
often untrue, but it has encouraged courts to invent new remedies for 
consumers and to impose new duties on producers whenever a new lia-
bility issue has arisen.17 Although the courts have not yet imposed abso-
of Law, 36 S. TEx. L. REv. 227, 245 (1995) ("While not the sole culprit, strict tort liability has been 
a significant contributor to the decline in competitiveness of American industry."). 
11. See Kenneth S. Abraham et aI., Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury: Further Re-
flections, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 333, 338 (1993) ("Some features operating within the tort system, 
however, appear to aggravate the problem of unaffordable (or unavailable) insurance coverage."); 
Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, A Permanent Solution for Product Liability Crises: Uni-
form Federal Tort Law Standards, 64 DENY. U. L. REv. 685, 686 (1988) ("Dramatic and unpredict-
able changes in tort law rules have made it difficult, if not impossible, for insurers to accurately 
price various classes of liability insurance."). 
12. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Taking Advantage of the Torts Crisis, 48 Owo ST. LJ. 329, 
335-36 (1987) ("In fact, in some mass tort situations, the amounts of money sought and likely to be 
awarded are so great as to threaten to exhaust both the liability insurance and the underlying capital 
of the defendant enterprises."). 
13. See PETER W. HUBER, LIABlLlTY: nm LEGAL REvOumON AND ITS CoNSEQUENCES 155-161 
(1988); C. Boyden Gray, Regulation and Federalism, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 93, 97 (1983) ("Because 
manufacturers cannot predict the standards by which their products will be judged, they may be re-
luctant to introduce new designs or innovative products."); Note, A Question of Competence: The 
Judicial Role in the Regulation of Pharmaceuticals, 103 HARv. L. REv. 773, 775 (1990) ("[L]iability 
fears may inhibit the development of drugs in the first instance by skewing research and develop-
ment incentives away from fields that contain a high background risk of untoward effects."). 
14. See W. KIP VISCUSI. REFORMING PRODUcrs LIABlLlTY 8 (1991) (arguing that tort liability 
costs caused production of private airplanes to fall from 17,000 to 1,085); Pennington Landen, Fed-
eral Preemption and the Drug Industry: Can Courts Co-Regulate?, 43 FOOD DRUG CoSM. W. 85, 
119 (1988) ("In addition to chilling new remedies, litigation has already forced some manufacturers 
to remove useful products from the marlcet. "). 
15. See generally George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of 
the Intellectual Foundations of Modem Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985) (discussing the role 
of enterprise liability during the formative years of products liability). 
16. See Howard C. Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 417 u. CoLO. L. REv. 
153, 159 (1976). 
17. See, e.g., Jordan v. Sunnyslope Appliance Propane & Plumbing Supplies Co., 660 P.2d 
1236, 1242 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (extension of strict liability found appropriate for sellers of used 
products because of their superior ability to "shift losses, distribute costs, or insure against losses"); 
Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980) (imposing market-share liability on pharma-
ceutical companies because "[t]he manufacturer is in the best position to discover and guard against 
defects in its products and to warn of harmful effects"); Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 8-9 (Cal. 
1977) (holding that subjecting successor corporations to liability for defective products manufactured 
by their predecessors was based on "the successor's ability to assume the original manufacturer's 
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lute liability on product sellers, this steady expansion of liability has now 
reached the point where the entire system of products liability is in dan-
ger of collapsing under the weight of excessive producer liability. IS 
This has led some reformers to recommend that the existing prod-
ucts liability regime be modified or replaced by a different system. Pro-
posals have ranged from ingenious neo-contractual arrangements19 to 
comprehensive social insurance programs.20 One such alternative, which 
will be examined in greater detail below, is to replace the existing sys-
tem of products liability with a statutory compensation scheme based on 
insurance principles. This approach assumes that consumers who buy a 
product also purchase protection against product-related injuries. In return 
risk-spreading" function); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 1980) (ap-
proving of punitive damages in strict liability cases because manufacturers have "virtually exclusive 
access to much of the information necessary for effective control of dangers facing product consum-
ers"); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 549 (NJ. 1982) (imposition of liability 
on product sellers for unknowable risks justified on the grounds that it will increase product safety 
research and spare victims "the burdensome financial consequences of unfit products"); Cintrone v. 
Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 212 A.2d 769, 778 (NJ. 1965) (extending strict liability to 
bailor because bailor's expertise "ought to put him in a better position than the bailee to detect or to 
anticipate flaws or defects or fatigue in his vehicles"). 
18. See VISCUSI, supra note 14, at 8 (discussing the adverse effect of tort liability on the pro-
duction of private airplanes); Louis Lasagna, The Chilling Effect of Product Liability on New Drug 
Development, in THE LIABn.ITY MAzE: THE IMPACf OP LIABn.ITY LAw ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 
334, 334-48 (peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991) [hereinafter THE LIABILITY MAzE] 
(describing the adverse effect of products liability on research and development efforts within the 
pharmaceutical industry); George L. Priest, Puzzles of the Tort Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. LJ. 497, 500 
(1987) [hereinafter Priest, Puzzles of the Tort Crisis] (stating that the threat of tort liability caused 
many products to be taken off the market); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Mod- ' 
em Tort Law, 96 YALE W. 1521, 1550-63 (1987) [hereinafter Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis] 
(describing how increasing tort liability has made it difficult for product manufacturers to obtain lia-
bility insurance at reasonable cost); W. Kip VIScusi, Wading Through the Muddle of Risk-Utility 
Analysis, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 573, 588 (1990) (observing that liability imposed by tort law bankrupted 
the asbestos industry). 
19. See, e.g., Jeffrey O'Connell, Balanced Proposals for Product Liability Refonn, 48 OHIO ST. 
W. 317, 322-28 (1987) [hereinafter O'Connell, Balanced Proposals] (proposing that product sellers 
be allowed to avoid tort claims by offering periodic payment of claimant's net economic loss); Jef-
frey O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault" Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preaccident Guarantees of Postaccident 
Settlement Offers, 73 CAL. L. REv. 898, 906-10 (1985) [hereinafter O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault" 
Contract] (proposing a scheme by which product sellers and providers of services can avoid litiga-
tion by warranting to tender compensation for victim's net economic injury within 9{) days regardless 
of the existence of tort liability); Jeffrey O'Connell, An Immediate Solution to Some Products Liabil-
ity Problems: Workers' Compensation as a Sole Remedy for Employees, with an Employer's Remedy 
Against Third Parties, 1976 INs. LJ. 683, 685-87 (proposing to limit claims of injured workers to 
workers compensation benefits and to prohibit them from suing product sellers or suppliers). 
20. See, e.g., Sugannan, supra note I, at 642-51 (proposing that tort law, including products 
liability, be replaced by a combination of increased government regulation and compensation pro-
grams to cover disability and medical expenses). 
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for a "premium," which is reflected in the price of the product, the 
product seller agrees to compensate the consumer on a no-fault basis for 
certain types of product-related losses. Under such an arrangement, there-
fore, payments made by product sellers to accident victims are consid-
ered indemnification payments rather than damage awards. This perspec-
tive opens up many avenues that are foreclosed under the traditional 
enterprise liability rationale of products liability. For example, by re-
jecting enterprise liability, it is no longer necessary to design a products 
liability regime which must balance product safety and compensation 
goals; instead, the system can focus solely on providing compensation to 
accident victims at the cheapest cost 
In this article, I examine an approach under which product sellers 
would be obligated to reimburse injured consumers on a no-fault basis 
for economic losses and nothing more. This arrangement promises to be 
less complicated and cheaper to administer than the present products lia-
bility system. The article is divided into four parts. Part IT analyzes the 
concept of enterprise liability and the assumptions that underlie it: (1) 
that consumers need protection against the superior knowledge and eco-
nomic power of product manufacturers; (2) that strict liability will en-
courage manufacturers to optimize product safety; and (3) that manufac-
turers are better able than consumers to spread product-related losses.21 
However, I fmd that all of these assumptions are suspect and, therefore, 
conclude that enterprise liability does not really provide a credible foun-
dation for products liability. 
Part ill considers whether products liability can be conceptualized as 
a fonn of insurance. First, I examine the traditional theory which some 
commentators rely upon as a rationale for the existing system of products 
liability. I conclude that it is impossible to reconcile first-party insurance 
principles with the system of open-ended liability that prevails under 
products liability law. However, I also find that the insurance rationale 
will support a more modest compensation scheme under which producer 
liability is limited to net economic losses. 
Part IV identifies a number of characteristics that one would expect 
to find in a coherent insurance-based compensation scheme for product-
related injuries. These features include: (1) a strong regulatory compli-
ance defense in design defect and failure to warn cases; (2) elimination 
of awards for nonpecuniary damages; (3) exclusion of punitive damage 
21. See Stephen P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for 
Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REv. 683, 706 (1993). 
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awards; (4) limitations on the doctrine of joint and several liability; (5) 
prohibition of suits against product sellers by employees who have al-
ready received workers compensation awards; and (6) abolition of the 
collateral source rule in products liability cases. 
Finally, Part V addresses some additional issues that are relevant to 
the adoption of an insurance-based compensation scheme. One such issue 
is whether the implementation of an insurance-based compensation mech-
anism would adversely affect product safety. A second consideration is 
whether switching from the present products liability regime to one based 
on insurance principles would have undesirable distributional effects. An-
other concern is how attorneys' fees will be paid if damage awards are 
drastically reduced. A fourth issue is whether principles of comparative 
fault should be applied in products liability litigation. Yet another topic 
for discussion is whether product sellers should be allowed to increase or 
decrease their liability through the use of warranties and disclaimers. Fi-
nally, there is the question of whether an insurance-based scheme should 
be implemented at the state or the federal level. 
II. ENTERPRISE LIABILITY As A RATIONALE FOR PRODUcrS LIABILITY 
The theory of enterprise liability provides that businesses that en-
gage in activities which impose risks on others ought to compensate 
those who are injured.22 This theory is grounded on principles of fair-
ness23 and economic efficiency.24 In the 1960's and 1970's, enterprise lia-
22. See Fleming James, Jr., An Evaluation of the Fault Concept, 32 TENN. L. REv. 394, 399-
400 (1965) ("This point of view, which may be called enterprise liability, is most simply stated by 
the proposition that an activity •.. should pay for the accident loss it causes because, as a general 
proposition, each enterprise in our society should pay its own way."); Klemme, supra note 16, at 
158 ("In its broadest terms the theory of enterprise liability in torts is that losses to society created 
or caused by an enterprise or, more simply, by an activity, oUght to be borne by that enterprise or 
activity."); Priest, supra note IS, at 463 ("This conception, which its proponents called the theory of 
enterprise liability, provides in its simplest form that business enterprises ought to be responsible for 
losses resulting from products they introduce into commerce."). 
23. See Fleming James, Jr., Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 
57 YALE LJ. 549, 550 (1948) ("If a certain type of loss is the more or less inevitable by-product of 
a desirable but dangerous form of activity it may well be just to distribute such losses among all the 
beneficiaries of the activity though it would be unjust to visit them severally upon those individuals 
who had happened to be the faultless instruments causing them."). 
24. See James, supra note 22, at 400 ("The proposition that an enterprise should pay its way 
has been defended on general considerations of fairness and on the economist's argument that this 
leads to a proper allocation of limited' resources in a free society."); Gary J. Highland, Note, Sales of 
Defective Used Products: Should Strict Liability Apply?, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 80S, 813 (1979) ("Enter-
prise liability in the form of strict products liability tends to optimize the allocation of resources by 
forcing businesses to include, as part of the cost of doing business, the costs of injuries caused by 
defects in products that they sell."). 
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 675 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 676 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 677 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 678 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 679 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 680 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 681 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 682 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 683 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 684 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 685 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 686 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 687 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 688 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 689 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 690 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 691 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 692 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 693 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 694 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 695 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 696 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 697 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 698 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 699 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 700 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 701 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 702 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 703 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 704 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 705 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 706 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 707 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 708 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 709 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 710 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 711 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 712 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 713 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 714 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 715 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 716 1996-1997
HeinOnline -- 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 717 1996-1997
